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Abstract. We propose a new approach to formalize obligations
and permissions from existing legislation. Specifically, we propose
to combine two frameworks: Input/Output logic and the logic of
prof. J.R. Hobbs. The former is a well-known framework in norma-
tive reasoning. The latter is a neo-Davidsonian wide-coverage first
order logic for Natural Language Semantics. We propose to wrap In-
put/Ouput logic around Hobbs’s logic, in order to fill the gap between
current logical formalizations of legal text, mostly propositional, and
the richness of Natural Language Semantics.
1 Introduction
State-of-the-art systems in legal informatics exploit NLP tools in or-
der to transform, possibly semi-automatically, legal documents into
XML standards such as Akoma Ntoso2, where relevant information
are tagged [5] [4]. Although these systems help navigate legislation
and retrieve information, their overall usefulness is limited due to
their focus on terminological issues while disregarding semantic as-
pects, which allow for legal reasoning.
Deontic Logic (DL) has been used since the 1950s as a formal in-
strument to model normative reasoning in law [38] [31]. However,
subsequent developments in DL adopt an abstract view of law, with
a very loose connection with the texts of regulations, which can be
addressed with solutions coming from the literature on Natural Lan-
guage Semantics (NLS). Most current proposals in DL are propo-
sitional, while NLS includes a wide range of fine-grained linguistic
phenomena that require first-order logic (FOL) formalisms.
We aim at designing a logical framework able to fill the gap be-
tween standard (propositional) constructs used in DL and the rich-
ness of NLS. Among the logical frameworks (independently) pro-
posed in the literature in NLS and DL respectively, we believe that
two of them feature fundamental advantages: (1) the FOL of prof.
J.R. Hobbs, designed to model the meaning of NL utterances via
reification, and (2) Input/Output (I/O) logic, originally proposed in
[27] to model deontic normative statements.
Reification is a concept originally introduced by the philosopher
D. Davidson in [7]. It allows to move from standard notations in FOL
such as ‘(give a b c)’, asserting that ‘a’ gives ‘b’ to ‘c’, to another
notation in FOL ‘(give′ e a b c)’, where e is the reification of the
giving action. ‘e’ is a FOL term denoting the giving event by ‘a’ of
‘b’ to ‘c’. In line with [2], e is said an “eventuality”.
On the other hand, I/O logic is a well-known formalism in DL
[9], thanks to its ability to deal with standard problems in DL, e.g.,
contrary-to-duty reasoning [27] and moral conflicts [32].
This paper presents a possible merging of Hobbs’s logic and I/O
logic that tries to combine their respective advantages. We restrict
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our attention to only obligations and permissions, i.e. the two main
kinds of norms [36]. We leave other kinds of norms for future works.
We work on a corpus of EU directives, from which we selected the
obligation in (1.a) (Dir. 98/5/EC) and the permission in (1.b) (Dir.
2001/110/EC). We did not find relevant differences between (1.a-b)
and the other norms in the corpus, thus we assume our solution is
general enough to cover a representative part of EU legislation.
(1) a. A lawyer who wishes to practise in a Member State other
than that in which he obtained his professional qualification
shall register with the competent authority in that State.
b. Where baker’s honey has been used as an ingredient in a
compound foodstuff, the term ‘honey’ may be used in the
product name of the compound food instead of the term
‘baker’s honey’.
2 Related works
Some approaches in Legal Informatics try to model, in some deontic
settings, NL sentences coming from existing norms, such as those in
(1). The most representative work is perhaps [37]. Other examples
may be found in [12] and [1]. Some approaches, e.g. [19], [8], and
[15] among others, formalize legal knowledge via Event Calculus
[23], a logical language extending reification by introducing special
terms and predicates to deal with time points and time periods [10]. A
similar account has been investigated by [22] in modal action logic.
To our knowledge, the approach that appears to be closest to the
one we are going to propose below is perhaps McCarty’s Language
for Legal Discourse (LLD) [29]. LLD is strongly drawn on previous
studies on NLS, it uses reification, and it aims at modeling existing
legal text. [30] shows how it is possible to obtain LLD structures
from federal civil cases in the appellate courts in USA via NLP.
However, LLD is very reminiscent of formalisms standardly used
in NLS, such as Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) [21], and
Minimal Recursion Semantics (MRS) [6]. Those are characterized by
a close relation between syntax and semantics, in line with the well-
known Montague’s principle of compositionality3, a cornerstone of
standard formalisms used in NLS.
The principle of compositionality leads to representation based
on embeddings of subformulae within the logical operators, which
establish a hierarchy among the predications. For instance, a simple
sentence like “John believes that Jack wants to eat an ice cream”
could be represented via the following formula (assuming a de-dictio
interpretation of the existential quantifier):
3 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
montague-semantics/#Com
believe[ John,
want( Jack,
∃x[(iceCream x) ∧ (eat Jack x)] ]
Where believe and want are modal operators taking an individual
as first argument and another (embedded) subformula as second ar-
gument. In the last formula, the operator believe is hierarchically
outscoping the operator want, in the sense that the latter occurs
within the scope of the former.
Nevertheless, it has been shown by [16], [33], and [34] among
others, that such an architecture prevents several available readings
in NL, and more complex operators, able to connect the predications
across the hierarchy, must be introduced to properly represent them.
For this reason, Hobbs proposed a logic where all formulae are
flat, i.e. where no hierarchy is established among the predications.
3 Hobbs’ logical framework
Prof. J.R. Hobbs defines a wide-coverage first-order logic (FOL) for
NLS centered on reification. See [17] and several other earlier publi-
cations by the same author4. In Hobbs’, eventualities may be possible
or actual5. This distinction is represented via a predicate Rexist that
holds for eventualities really existing in the world. Eventualities may
be inserted as parameters of such predicates as want, believe, etc.
Reification can be applied recursively. The fact that “John believes
that Jack wants to eat an ice cream” is represented as:
∃e∃e1∃e2∃x[ (Rexist e) ∧ (believe′ e John e1) ∧
(want′ e1 Jack e2) ∧ (eat′ e2 Jack x) ∧ (iceCream′ e3 x) ]
The crucial feature of Hobbs’ logic, which distinguishes it from all
other neo-Davidsonian approaches, e.g., LLD, is that all formulae
are “flat”, in the sense explained above. Specifically, the framework
distinguishes between the formulae belonging to the ABox of an on-
tology from those belonging to its TBox. The ABox only includes
conjunctions of atomic predicates asserted on FOL terms. On the
other hand, the TBox defines these predicates in terms of the Rexist
predicate and standard FOL. All logical operators, e.g., boolean con-
nectives6, are modeled in this way. For instance, negation is modeled
via a predicate not′ defined in the TBox as:
(2) For all e and e1 such that (not′ e e1) holds, it also holds:
(Rexist e)↔¬ (Rexist e1)
If (not′ e e1) is true, all what we know is that the individuals e and e1
are related via the not′ predication. But this does not tell us anything
about the real existence of either e or e1. Similarly, and and imply
are “conjunctive” and “implicative” relations such that (3) and (4)
respectively hold (on the other hand, we omit disjunction).
(3) For all e, e1, e2 such that (and′ e e1 e2) holds, it also holds:
(Rexist e)↔ (Rexist e1) ∧ (Rexist e2)
(4) For all e, e1, e2 such that (imply′ e e1 e2) holds, it also holds:
(Rexist e)↔ ((Rexist e1)→ (Rexist e2))
4 See manuscripts at http://www.isi.edu/˜hobbs/csk.html and
http://www.isi.edu/˜hobbs/csknowledge-references/
csknowledge-references.html.
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Hobbs and his followers implements a fairly large set of predi-
cates for handling composite entities, causality, time, defeasibility,
event structure, etc. For instance, [35] proposes a solution to model
concessive relations, one of the most trickiest semantic relations oc-
curring in NL, in Hobbs’s logic.
The meaning of the predicates is restricted by adding ‘axiom
schemas’. Space constraints forbid us to illustrate details about all
predicates defined by Hobbs. A possible axiom schema for the legal
domain is shown in (5). (5) states that all lawyers are humans:
(5) For all e1, x such that (lawyer’ e1 x) holds, it also holds:
∃ei∃e2[(imply′ ei e1 e2) ∧ (Rexist ei) ∧ (human’ e2 x)]
4 Handling deontic defeasible reasoning in legal
interpretation
A major problem in legal informatics concerns the proper interpre-
tation of laws in given situations, which is up to the judges in courts
[24]. Legal interpretation is a well-studied topic in legal informatics,
cf. [25] among others. For instance, in (1.a), to what extent should we
think of a lawyer who wishes to practise in a Member State different
from the one he obtained his qualification? Under a literal interpreta-
tion of the verb “wishes”, which may be taken as its default interpre-
tation, a lawyer who simply tells some friends he would like to do so
already violates the norm, if he is not registered with the competent
authority. On the other hand, a reasonable (pragmatic) interpretation
is that the norm is violated only if the non-registered lawyer performs
some “formal” action, such as defending someone in court. Accord-
ing to the norm, that action should be blocked and the lawyer must
possibly pay a penalty.
So far, few approaches have been proposed to handle multiple le-
gal interpretations in logic. A recent one is [13], where a solution to
deal with them in Defeasible Deontic Logic [12] via prioritized de-
feasible rules is proposed. Priorities are introduced to rank the avail-
able interpretations, i.e. to solve potential conflicts among them.
Following [13], we handle multiple legal interpretations via
Hobbs’s methodology to deal with defeasibility, which is in turn
drawn from Circumscriptive Logic [28]. However, we do not claim
that our solution features any particular advantage with respect to the
one in [13], except the fact that our framework is first-order while
Defeasible Deontic Logic is propositional.
The idea is simple and we illustrate it with an example. The fact
that every bird flies is represented in FOL as ∀x[bird(x)→fly(x)].
In order to render the rule defeasible, we add another predi-
cate normalBF stating that birds fly only if it is “normal” to
assume so: ∀x[(bird(x) ∧ normalBF (x))→fly(x)]. Adding that
emus are non-flying birds, i.e. ∀x[emu(x)→(bird(x) ∧¬fly(x))],
does not entail an inconsistency. It entails that normalBF (x) is
false for each emu x. In this sense, the latter rule is “stronger”
than the former. Alternatively, we may directly assert that emus
are not “normal” with respect to the property of flying, i.e.
∀x[emu(x)→¬normalBF (x)]. normalBF must be assumed to
be true in order to trigger the property of flying on birds.
Different legal interpretations of “wishes” in (1.a) are similarly
handled. Let us assume by default that if a lawyer x says he will
practise in a Member State y, then he really wishes to do it.
(6) For all x, y, e1, e2, e3 such that (lawyer x) ∧ (MS y) ∧
(say’ e1 x e2) ∧ (wish’ e2 x e3) ∧ (practice’ e3 x) ∧ (in e3 y)
holds, it also holds:
∃ei[(imply′ ei e1 e2) ∧ (Rexist ei)]
To make (6) defeasible, we add a predicate normalSP stating that the
entailment is valid only if it is “normal” to assume it:
(7) For all x, y, e1, e2, e3 such that (lawyer x) ∧ (MS y) ∧
(say’ e1 x e2) ∧ (wish’ e2 x e3) ∧ (practice’ e3 x) ∧ (in e3 y)
holds, it also holds:
∃ei∃ea∃en[(imply′ ei ea e2) ∧ (Rexist ei) ∧
(and′ ea e1 en) ∧ (normalSP ’ en e1)]
In (7), the real existence of e1 is no longer sufficient to entail the
one of e2. In order to enable the entailment, the real existence of
en is also needed. Now, a judge may reasonably decide that it is not
normal assuming that a lawyer who says he will practice in a Member
State entails that he “wishes” (in the sense of (1.a)) to do so, i.e.:
(8) For all x, y, e1, e2, e3 such that (lawyer x) ∧ (MS y) ∧
(say’ e1 x e2) ∧ (wish’ e2 x e3) ∧ (practice’ e3 x) ∧ (in e3 y)
holds, it also holds:
∃enn∃en[(not′ enn en) ∧ (Rexist enn) ∧ (normalSP ’ en e1)]
From (8), in case a lawyer x simply says he wishes to practice in a
Member State y, we infer that en does not really exist. Thus, it is no
longer possible to infer, from (7), whether e2 really exists or not.
5 Input/Output logic
Input/Output (I/O) logic was introduced in [27]. It originates from
the study of conditional norms. I/O logic is a family of logics, just
like modal logic is a family of systems K, S4, S5, etc. However, un-
like modal logic, which usually uses possible world semantics, I/O
logic adopts operational semantics: an I/O system is conceived as a
“deductive machine”, like a black box which produces deontic state-
ments as output, when we feed it factual statements as input.
As explained in [9], operational semantics solves the well-known
Jørgensen’s dilemma [20], which roughly says that a proper truth-
conditional logic of norms is impossible because norms do not carry
truth values. According to Jørgensen, typical problems of standard
deontic logic arise from its truth-conditional model theory, i.e., pos-
sible world semantics. On the other hand, operational semantics
straightforwardly allows to deal with contrary-to-duty reasoning,
moral conflicts, etc. We address the reader to [26] and [32] among
others for further explanations and examples.
Furthermore, I/O logic is one of the few existing frameworks for
normative reasoning where also permissions, and not only obliga-
tions, have been studied in depth. Most current proposals are not
specifically devoted to deal with existing legislation, and so they
mostly focus on obligations only. For instance, in [15], devoted to
handle business process compliance (BPC), obligations are analyzed
in detail, while permissions are mostly neglected, in that the former
play a role in BPC more prominent than the latter. The account in
[15] has been recently extended to handle permissions in [11].
In [27], four basic I/O logics are defined: out1, out2, out3, and
out4. Let L be standard propositional logic, letO and P be two sub-
sets of L × L, and let A to be a subset of L, i.e. a set of formulae in
standard propositional logic. Each pair (a, b) in O is read as “given
a, b is obligatory” while each pair (c, d) in P is read as “given c,
d is permitted”. Pairs in O and P are called “generators” and rep-
resent the “deduction machine”: whenever one of the left-hand side
(LHS) of the pairs is given in input, the corresponding right-hand
side (RHS) is given in output.
(9) defines the semantics of out1, . . . , out4. Cn is the con-
sequence operator of propositional logic; it takes in input a set of
formulae A and returns the set corresponding to the transitive clo-
sure of all formulae that can be entailed from A. A set of formulas is
complete if it is either maximally consistent or equal to L.
(9) • out1(O,A)=Cn(O(Cn(A)))
• out2(O,A)=⋂{Cn(O(V )): A⊆V, V is complete}
• out3(O,A)=⋂{Cn(O(B)): A⊆B = Cn(B) ⊇O(B)}
• out4(O,A)=⋂{Cn(O(V ): A⊆V⊇O(V )), V is complete}
In (10), we report the axioms needed to define the I/O systems having
the semantics from out1 to out4. ` is the entailment relation of
propositional logic.
(10) • SI: from (a, x) to (b, x) whenever b ` a.
• OR: from (a, x) and (b, x) to (a ∨ b, x).
• WO: from (a, x) to (a, y) whenever x ` y.
• AND: from (a, x) and (a, y) to (a, x ∧ y).
• CT: from (a, x) and (a ∧ x, y) to (a, y).
The axioms in (10) constrain the generators belonging to O and P .
For instance, CT says that in case two generators (a, x) and (a∧x, y)
belongs to O, then also the generator (a, y) must belong to O.
The derivation system based on SI, WO, and AND is called
deriv1. Adding OR to deriv1 gives deriv2. Adding CT to
deriv1 gives deriv3. The five rules together give deriv4. Each
derivi is sound and complete with respect to outi (see [27]).
An example of how the axioms in (10) work in practice is pro-
vided below directly on our FOL object logic. As pointed out above,
the expressivity of I/O logic, as well as the one of its competitors,
e.g., Imperative Logic [14], Prioritized Default Logic [18], and De-
feasible Deontic Logic [12] among others, is limited to the proposi-
tional level. On the other hand, Hobbs’s logic, thanks to its formal
simplicity, allows to enhance the expressivity of I/O systems to the
first-order level with little modifications of the axioms in (10).
6 Combining Input/Output logic and Hobbs’s logic
Propositional logic does not have enough expressivity to represent
real-world obligations and permissions, such as (1.a-b). Universally
quantified variables and constant or functional terms are also needed.
For instance, “a lawyer” and “a Member State” in (1.a) refer to
every lawyer and every Member State. On the other hand, the expres-
sion “that in which he obtained his professional qualification” ought
to be represented as a function f1(x) that, given a lawyer x, returns
the Member State where he obtained his professional qualification.
Similarly, the expression “the competent authority in that State” is
represented as a function f2(y) that, given a Member State y, returns
the competent authority in that State. Finally, “the term ‘honey’ ” and
“the term ‘baker’s honey’ ” in (1.b) correspond to two FOL constants
Th Tbh respectively, denoting the two English words.
Our formulae are Hobbs’s conjunctions of atomic predications,
possibly involving FOL variables. Some of those variables will occur
both in the LHS and the RHS of an I/O generator, while the others
will occur either in the LHS or in the RHS. The variables occurring
in both will be universally quantified, while the ones occurring in
either one of the two will be existentially quantified. Furthermore,
we will require each formula of the object logic to assert exactly one
Rexist predicate on the main eventuality. As explained in section 3,
the semantics of Hobbs’s logic is centered on the Rexist predicate.
We add a single construct to the syntax of the generators: universal
quantifiers for binding the variables occurring in both the LHS and
the RHS. These quantifiers act as “bridges” between the LHS and
the RHS, in order to “carry” individuals from the input to the
output. Formally, our generators have the following form, where
LHS(x1, x2, . . . , xn) and RHS(x1, x2, . . . , xn) are conjunctions
of FOL predicates; x1, x2, . . . , xn are free in LHS and RHS but
they are externally bound by universal quantifiers. LHS and RHS
will possibly include other existentially quantified variables.
∀x1∀x2 . . .∀xn (LHS(x1, x2, . . . , xn), RHS(x1, x2, . . . , xn))
This architectural choice is motivated by an empirical analysis of
the obligations/permissions in our corpus of EU Directives. Norms
found in legislation typically hold for all members in a certain set
of individuals, e.g. the set of all lawyers. On the other hand, we did
not find in our corpus any obligation or permission in the form “If a
lawyer exists, then he is obliged to take some actions”. This sounds
quite intuitive: statements in legislation are typically universal asser-
tions, i.e., they do not hold for single specific individuals.
Note that, in any case, as long as formulae are conjunctions
of atomic predicates, de re obligations/permissions can be easily
dealt with by removing existentials via skolemization. A generator
in the form ∃x(LHS(x), RHS(x)) can be substituted by (LHS(i),
RHS(i)), where i is a FOL constant skolemizing ∃x. On the other
hand, a generator in the form ∀x∃y(LHS(x, y), RHS(x, y)) can be
substituted by ∀x(LHS(x, f (x)), RHS(x, f (x))), where f is a FOL
function skolemizing ∃x. Existentials occurring in the object logic
formulae can be also skolemized. For instance, a generator in the
form ∀x(∃yLHS(x, y), RHS(x)) can be substituted by ∀x(LHS(x,
f (x)), RHS(x)), where f is a FOL function skolemizing ∃x.
Similarly, it must be observed that, in finite domains, universal
quantifiers are just a compact way to refer to all individuals in the
universe. We obtain an equivalent set of generators by substitut-
ing the universally quantified variables with all constants referring
each to an individual in the universe. For instance, assuming the uni-
verse includes the individuals a, b, c only, the generator ∀x(LHS(x),
RHS(x)) is equivalent to the set of generators (LHS(a), RHS(a)),
(LHS(b), RHS(b)), and (LHS(c), RHS(c)).
6.1 Generalizing Input/Output logic axioms
We have proposed above to integrate Hobbs’s logic within I/O gener-
ators by simply adding wide-scope universal quantifiers to the syntax
of the generators, in order to create a “bridge” for “carrying” the FOL
terms matching the LHS to the output. Also the axioms in (10) need
to be generalized accordingly. This section shows the generalization
of the axiom CT. The generalization of the other axioms is similar
and it is left to the reader as an exercise. CT is generalized as in (11).
(11) from: ∀x1 . . .∀xn (
∃e11∃y11 . . .∃y1i [(Rexist e11) ∧ (Ψ′1 e11 y11 . . . y1i x1 . . . xn)],
∃e21∃y21 . . .∃y2j [(Rexist e21) ∧ (Ψ′2 e21 y21 . . . y2j x1 . . . xn)])
and: ∀x1 . . .∀xn (∃e∃e11∃y11 . . .∃y1i∃e21∃y21 . . .∃y2j[
(Rexist e) ∧ (and′ e e11 e21) ∧ (Ψ′1 e11 y11 . . . y1i x1 . . . xn) ∧
(Ψ′2 e21 y21 . . . y2j x1 . . . xn)],
∃e31∃y31 . . .∃y3k [(Rexist e31)∧ (Ψ′3 e31 y31 . . . y3k x1 . . . xn)])
to: ∀x1 . . .∀xn (
∃e11∃y11 . . .∃y1i [(Rexist e11) ∧ (Ψ′1 e11 y11 . . . y1i x1 . . . xn)],
∃e31∃y31 . . .∃y3k [(Rexist e31)∧ (Ψ′3 e31 y31 . . . y3k x1 . . . xn)])
An example is: given “Every lawyer is obliged to run” and “Every
lawyer who runs is obliged to wear a red hat”, formalized in (12):
(12) ∀x( ∃e11 [(Rexist e11) ∧ (lawyer′ e11 x)],
∃e21 [(Rexist e21) ∧ (run′ e21 x)] )
∀x( ∃e∃e11∃e21 [(Rexist e) ∧ (and′ e e11 e21) ∧
(lawyer′ e11 x) ∧ (run′ e21 x)],
∃e31 [(Rexist e31) ∧ (wearRedHat′ e31 x)] )
in case the I/O system includes the axiom in (11), O must include
(13), which refers to “Every lawyer is obliged to wear a red hat”.
(13) ∀x( ∃e11 [(Rexist e11) ∧ (lawyer′ e11 x)],
∃e31 [(Rexist e31) ∧ (wearRedHat′ e21 x)])
6.2 Formalizing the examples in (1)
We have now all the ingredients for representing (1.a-b). In a norma-
tive Input/Output systemN=(O,P ), the former is inserted inO while
the latter is inserted in P . The formula representing (1.a) is:
(14) ∀x∀y( ∃e1∃e2 [(Rexist e1) ∧ (lawyer x) ∧ (MS y) ∧
(wish’ e1 x e2) ∧ (practice’ e2 x) ∧ (in e2 y) ∧ diffFrom(y f1(x))],
∃e3 [(Rexist e3) ∧ (register’ e3 x) ∧ (at e3 f2(y))] )
As discussed in section 4, the predicate wish, as well as any other
predicate, may be subject to different legal interpretations, which
may be asserted in the knowledge base via the mechanism used in
Hobbs’s to handle defeasibility.
The permission in (1.b) is similarly formalized as in (15).
(15) ∀y(∃x∃e1 [(Rexist e1) ∧ (ingrOf’ e1 x y) ∧
(bakerHoney x) ∧ (foodStuff y)],
∃e2 [(Rexist e2) ∧ (substitute’ e2 Th Tbh) ∧ (in e2 f3(y))]
Note that the variable x occurs in the LHS only, thus it is exis-
tentially quantified. The formula in (15) reads as follows: for each
compound foodstuff y for which it is “true” (in the sense that it re-
ally exists in the current world) the fact that one of its ingredients is
baker’s honey, then it is permitted that, in the current world, also the
fact that the term ‘honey’ is substituted by the term ‘baker’s honey’
in the product name of y really exist.
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